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Duquesne Law Review
Volume 16, Number 2, 1977-1978

Opinion Writers and Law Review Writers: A
Community and Continuity of Approach
Ruggero J. Aldisert*
"We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only
because we are final."
Justice Robert H. Jackson is responsible for this marvelous line.'
And so much wisdom abides in it. But even this most perceptive and
gifted Supreme Court Justice failed to reckon with a formidable
American institution that can seriously question the notion that
appellate judges are final. We may be final as far as particular
litigants are concerned, 2 but a case can be made that the last, or
final, word on the law is now a privilege entrusted to, or shall I say,
acquired by, the law review writers and editors of our law schools.
It is the American law review, this serious institution of scholarly
criticisms-sometimes volatile, sometimes impertinent, by nature
opinionated but never villainous-it is the law review that constantly subjects the work of appellate courts to intense, critical
scrutiny, to a jurisprudential dissection of our opinions, to a microscopic examination of the jural sinews and fibers that compose
the body of our published work. Law reviews indeed constitute an
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Judge Aldisert is
the author of THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (West, 1976). This article is based on remarks delivered
at the Duquesne University Law School Annual Law Review Dinner, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, May 28, 1977.
1. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
2. Strictly speaking, the United States Courts of Appeals are not "final" appellate courts.
The United States Supreme Court stands at the apex of the federal pyramid. But brute
statistics indicate that, de facto, these courts are final. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1977,
terminated in all circuits were 16,426 cases. During the same period, the Supreme Court
granted 162 petitions for review on writs of certiorari, denied 2,343, and dismissed 18 previously granted. [1976] Din. AD. OFT. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. Tables Bi, B2.
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extremely valuable, extra-judicial laboratory in which our various
specimens are meticulously studied and then evaluated as healthy
or pathological.
Although we judges come as unwilling patients to the scalpels and
incisions of law review writers, any judge sensitive to the activity or
reputation of his court should welcome the diagnosis and possible
surgery; at least, I do. In a system of government where the executive and legislative branches are constantly subject to public review
at the ballot box, but where appellate judges are lifetime or longterm, it is the law review that serves as an informal check and
balance; informal and unstructured, to be sure, but nevertheless, a
respectable and ever-present force.
Time and again I find myself discarding passages in draft opinions-enthusiastic passages that were the product of much zeal and
hours, if not days, of labor. I discard them because, after reflection,
I become convinced that my approach would not wash; that it would
not survive calm, detached appraisal, the withering gaze of critical
analysis-especially the inquisitorial scrutiny of a law review examination. And, at decision conferences, 3 my colleagues and I, in planning the outline of a proposed decision, are not above asking one
another if the design we are planning can withstand this same disciplined dissection. Thus, the role of the student law review as an
unabashed and immodest critic of state and federal appellate courts
is much to be desired and welcomed by the bench and bar.
In this spirit, it becomes appropriate to discuss rules and measures by which judicial opinions should be evaluated. I do not suggest anything revolutionary. Guidelines and standards for reviewing
an opinion are the same as those utilized in writing an opinion. For
this reason, I believe that the writer and the reviewer should approach an opinion from the same vantage point. A common approach would produce continuity, and thus yield meaningful
analyses to the readerships of both opinions and law reviews.
3. In the Third Circuit, cases are usually heard by panels of three judges. The judge to
whom the writing of the opinion is assigned prepares a draft opinion in accordance with the
collegial decision of the judges at the decision conference. The opinion-writing judge may also
choose to express views which he has reached after further study, but must circulate the final
draft opinion to other members of the panel with a request for approval or suggestions.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Professor Harry W. Jones of Columbia University, one of the true
giants of contemporary jurisprudence in this country, has written:
When one asked Pound whether a recent Supreme Court decision was a "good" decision or a "bad" one, the old gentleman-for so I remember him with gratitude and considerable
awe-had a way of answering not in terms of the correctness
or incorrectness of the Court's application of constitutional precedents or doctrine but in terms of how thoughtfully and disinterestedly the Court had weighed the conflicting social interests involved in the case and how fair and durable its adjustment of the interest-conflicts promised to be.'
Thoughtful and disinterested weighing of the conflicting interests is
the first rule impressed upon my law clerks. I suggest that it should
be the guiding rule and measure applied both by judges in writing
opinions, and by law review writers in analyzing opinions.
Although the beginning point for both writers and readers of judicial opinions may be the same, the manifested ends are sometimes
dissimilar: the law contained in the opinions is the law as it is; the
scholarship efforts of the law review writer culminate, more often
than not, in the law as it ought to be.5 When there is a coalescing
between the law that "is" and the law that "ought to be," a state
of jurisprudential bliss exists between academia and the courts.
More frequently, however, a chasm exists between "is" and "ought"
which law reviews seek to bridge. While that effort is heartily commendable, many loose planks endanger the wayfarer on that noble
crossing.
The multifaceted realms of "being" and "oughtness" have been
analyzed and discussed through the ages. The tension between the
opinion writer and the law review writer might well be a modernday parallel of the clash between Roman verum, truth, and certum,
certainty. But my concern here is not so much with philosophical
origins of the problem as with the postulate that notwithstanding
4. Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1029 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Jones].
5. Thus, Professor Morris L. Cohen has observed that "American legal periodicals parallel
in quality and variety the other secondary materials. They have been said to reflect the law
as it was, as it is, as it is tending, and as it ought to be." M. COHEN, LEGAL RESEARCH IN A
NUTSHELL

197 (2d ed. 1971).
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the innate tension, a meaningful, productive analysis requires a
significant community and continuity of approach between the
opinion writer and the reviewer.
As both a reader and writer of judicial opinions, I suggest that the
desired approach includes four areas which, if given greater attention from both writers and reviewers, would greatly aid both groups
in their quest to "thoughtfully and disinterestedly . . .[weigh] the
conflicting social interests involved in the case." ' First, the terminology used by judges and critics alike evidences sloppiness in identifying the legal precepts which are components of various rationes
decidendi. Second, there is often a failure to isolate precise contours
of the jurisprudential dispute before the court. Third, there is sometimes a failure to avoid, or to identify, fallacies of reasoning. Finally,
there is frequent failure to recognize and to evaluate the public
policy judgments that inhere in judicial lawmaking.
I.

IDENTIFYING THE LEGAL PRECEPTS

A discussion of the basic framework of a ratio decidendi must
invoke the writings of that great master of the American legal tradition, Roscoe Pound, who stated that the requisite ingredients constitute "the body of authoritative materials, and the authoritative
gradation of the materials, wherein judges are to find the grounds
of decision, counsellors the basis of assured prediction as to the
course of decision, and individuals reasonable guidance toward conducting themselves in accordance with the demands of the social
order." '7 It is extremely important to distinguish among the various
forms of legal precepts because, as sociologist Philip Selznick puts
it (and he puts it well), "If all laws are authoritative, some are more
authoritative than others."'
The importance to both writer and reviewer of ascertaining the
relative weight to be accorded various precepts is heightened by the
exigencies of translating into written word the respective writer's
analysis. Thus, phraseology must be precise and analytical processes must be valid, if we are to have the desired continuity of
6. See Jones, supra note 4, at 1029.
7. Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L. REv.
475, 476 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Pound].
8. Selznick, Sociology and NaturalLaw, 6 NAT. L.F. 84, 98 (1961), reprinted in M. GOLDING, THE NATuRE OF LAw 64 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Selznick].
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approach between writer and reviewer. Where Selznick has used the
word "law," I shall use Pound's formulation, "legal precept," and
define rules of law as precepts attaching a definite, detailed legal
consequence to a definite, detailed state of facts.' Rules are to be
distinguished from principles, which are authoritative starting
points for legal reasoning, employed continually and legitimately
where cases are either not covered at all or not fully covered by rules
in the narrower sense. Unlike rules, then, which emanate from specific factual complexes, principles do not attach a definite, detailed
legal result to a definite, detailed state of facts. The distinction
between rules and principles can be seen in the Restatement of
Restitution, in which it is stated that certain basic assumptions in
the restatement
are stated in the form of principles. They cannot be stated as
rules since either they are too indefinite to be of value in a
specific case or, for historical or other reasons, they are not
universally applied. They are distinguished from rules in that
they are intended only as general guides for the conduct of the
courts and are not intended to express that universality of application to particular cases which is characteristic of the statements made in subsesequent chapters. 0
Although Pound described other important guides to the formation of rationes decidendi," the most important distinction for our
9.

10.

Pound, supra note 7, at 482.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITTrnON,

Introductory Matters at 11 (1937). Roscoe Pound has

explained:
A principle is an authoritative starting point for legal reasoning from which we seek
rules or grounds of decision by deduction. Principles are the work of lawyers. They
organize experience of interpreting and applying rules or experience of advice to litigants or tribunals or experience of judicial decision by differentiating cases and putting
generalized propositions behind the differences. They compare a long developed experience of decision in some field, referring some cases to one general starting point for
reasoning and others to some other such starting point, or they find a more inclusive
starting point for a whole field. They come into the law with the advent of legal writing
and juristic speculation, so that the presence of this element as a controlling factor is
the mark of a developed legal system. Principles as such appear first at the end of the
stage of strict law. But an earlier form in the shape of legal proverbs or maxims goes
back to the beginnings of law.
II R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 125-26 (1959).
11. These include "conceptions," "doctrines," and "standards." See Pound, supra note
7, at 484-85. In order, they complete an inverted pyramid with the "rule" at its base.
"Conceptions" may be viewed as authoritative categories to which types or classes of transac-
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purposes is that between rules and principles. Confusion of these
two precepts is most often the basis for misunderstanding the crux
of an opinion, either because the opinion writer misconceives or
misuses the terms, or because the reviewer is guilty of the same
practice. One may appreciate the words of Professor Robert E. Keeton in this regard:
The contrast between principles and rules that is relevant .
concerns methods of change rather than susceptibility to
change. The narrow propositions commonly called rules are on
occasion changed abruptly; that is, precedents are overruled.
The broadest propositions, to which the term 'principle' is applied, are as near to immutability as anything in law.'"
Ronald Dworkin makes the point that rules are applicable on an
"all-or-nothing" basis: "If two rules conflict, one of them cannot be
a Valid rule.' 3 It is here that we usually resort to principles, because
"[pirinciples have a dimension that rules do not-the dimension
of weight or importance. When principles intersect, one who must
resolve the conflict has to take into account the relative weight of
each." 4
I insist that the legal precept be properly labeled or identified-but not for the sake of elegantiajuris or preciousness. There
are much more pragmatic considerations. When a specific holding
of a case is suddenly anointed with the chrism of "principle" there
is a very real effect on the doctrine (yes, I think it's a doctrine) of
stare decisis. The danger of a commentator or a writer of a subsequent opinion lifting a naked holding of a given case to the dignity
of a legal "principle" may give to a single appellate decision a precedential breadth never intended. It may confuse the dispute-settling
tions, cases, or situations are referred, in consequence of which a series of rules, principles,
and standards become applicable. "Doctrines" are defined as systematic meshings of rules,
principles, and conceptions in logically interdependent schemes whereby reasoning may proceed on the basis of the schemes and their logical implications. "Standards" are best described as general limits of permissible conduct (e.g., the "reasonably prudent man"), to be
applied according to the circumstances of the individual case. Standards may be differentiated from rules in that they are neither applied absolutely nor in any definite pattern. The
reader should attain a more comprehensive understanding of Pound's formulations from
reading his primary works. See, e.g., 11R. PouND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959); Pound, supra note

7.
12.
13.
14.

R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JuSncE 22 (1969).
Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm.L. REv. 14, 25, 27 (1967).
Id. at 27.
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role of a court with its responsibility of institutionalizing the law.
Institutionalization in the common law tradition, in Harlan Fiske
Stone's felicitous expression, is "preeminently a system built up by
gradual accretion of special instances."'' 5 And, in my view, the accretion is not gradual if you pile on an improper dimension to a specific
instance.
I candidly confess to a suspicion, and it is not more than that, that
a divergence of basic philosophy may exist between the traditional
common law lawyer-judge and the American legal academician.
Many legal commentators, both on and off the bench, appear to
have an infatuation with the Continental tradition of codification.
If the law is moving, stop it; freeze it; codify it. Thus appears the
current penchant for Uniform and Model Codes on everything from
commercial and criminal law to class action procedures, the mighty
efforts of the Restatements of the Law, and the frenetic activities
of the American Bar Association to procreate "standards" with undiminished vigor."6
It is my thesis that every holding of every case does not deserve
that same size black letter law treatment that some commentators
or codists wish to give it. If American case law is to develop properly
in the common law tradition, it is essential that the effect of specific
instances, i. e., the rules of law in the narrow, Poundian sense, be
given proper weight. But only proper, honest weight. And often,
describing a rule as a principle, or a doctrine, is interfering with the
measure of proper weight. It's putting a jurisprudential thumb on
the scale.
The ability to properly identify, and distinguish among, the various components of rationes decidendi is an ability which should be
developed in the writer or reviewer even prior to his or her taking
pen to hand. Only where both parties begin with a firm grasp of the
relative dimensions of the legal precepts involved in a dispute can
they be assured that they will use consistent and proper designations, and thus produce meaningful analysis. Ideally, the components will be clearly identified in the opinion, precluding any guess,
or value judgment, on the reviewer's part. Thus, where a judge
properly identifies the guiding principles, or controlling rule, the
15. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 6 (1936).
16. For an informal compilation of ALT Restatements and ABA Standards, see Aldisert,
The Role of the Courts in Contemporary Society, 38 U. Prrr. L. REv. 437, 450 nn.61 & 62
(1977).
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reviewer may merely restate the court's initial precept identification
and then focus his or her analysis on the choice of those precepts. If
after close examination, however, it appears that an opinion contains imprecise or improper labelling, we return to square one and
the reviewer's initial job is somewhat more complex. Such ambiguity itself warrants comment by the reviewer, who must ferret out
some common nomenclature on which the opinion can be reviewed.
III.

IDENTIFYING THE PRECISE DISPUTE

Analysis of the judicial process reveals four functions involved in
the decision of a case: (1) finding the facts; (2) finding the law, i.e.,
choosing the legal precept applicable to the facts found; (3) interpreting the precept; and (4) applying the precept to the facts at
hand. At the onset, a judge will evaluate the facts to determine
which are material to settlement of a dispute. 7 Selection of the
relevant law then envelops these facts in a particular arena of
competing legal precepts or competing analogies. The next step,
interpretation, may be "clear-cut," as with some precepts of contract or tort law, or it may involve broad principles subject to disparate analyses. 8 Finally, reasoned elaboration should support the
application of the precepts, so found and so interpreted, to the facts
at hand.
Professor Herbert Wechsler has aptly observed that the role of the
critic "is the sustained, disinterested, merciless examination of the
reasons that the courts advaace, measured by standards of
17. But, recall what Jerome Frank has observed:
It is sometimes said that part of the judge's function is to pick out the relevant facts.
Not infrequently this means that in writing his opinion he stresses (to himself as well
as to those who will read the opinion) those facts which are relevant to his conclusion-in other words, he unconsciously selects those facts which, in combination with
the rules of law which he considers to be pertinent, will make "logical" his decision. A
judge, eager to give a decision which will square with his sense of what is fair, but
unwilling to break with the traditional rules, will often view the evidence in such a way
that the "facts" reported by him, combined with those traditional rules, will justify
the result which he announces.
If this were done deliberately, one might call it dishonest, but should remember that
with judges this process is usually unconscious and that, however unwise it may be,
upright men in other fields employ it, and sometimes knowingly ....
J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 134-35 (1930) (footnote omitted), reprinted in R.
ALDISERT, THE JUDIcIAL PRocEss 698 (1976).

18. H.L.A. Hart cites constitutional law as one example of this "open texture" area. See
R. ALDiSEaT, THE JUDIcIAL PRocEss 493 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ALmiSERT].

1977-78

Law Review Writers

[reasoned principles]."' 19 Thus, effective interplay between the
writer and reviewer of a judicial opinion requires that the judge
elaborate and justify his or her disposition of the four basic functions, and that, likewise, the reviewer remain within these bounds
in examining the opinion.
We have seen that the proper terminology involves basically an
intellectual grasp of concepts on the part of the individual writer or
reviewer. 20 Identification of the precise dispute implicates both a
preferred methodology of analysis and an understanding of terms.
The introduction of a preferred procedure heightens the importance
of the community and continuity of approach between writer and
reviewer. When both exposition by the judge and examination by
the critic are set within the framework of the four basic functions,
determination of whether the ultimate decision in a case accords
with the Jones-Pound measures of being "right as possible" or
"good'' will be a more effective endeavor.
For example, the writer and reviewer may differ on the preferred
disposition of any of the four functions. The level at which disagreement occurs (if it occurs at all) may well dictate the entire tenor and
depth of a law review article. Thus, if the reviewer's sole dispute
with an opinion writer is over application of a given precept to the
facts at hand, there is no point in fashioning a long legal essay on
finding the facts, choosing the legal precept, or interpreting it.
In many instances, however, the reviewer will dispute not so much
the application of a given legal precept, but the court's choice of
that precept, i.e., the court's judgment regarding the similarity of
fact situations under comparison. Edward H. Levi has explained
that "the scope of a rule of law, and therefore its meaning, depends
upon a determination of what facts will be considered similar to
those present when the rule was first announced. The finding of
similarity or difference is the key step in the legal process. "22
To understand why disagreement between writer and reviewer
occurs most frequently on this level, we need only consider again one
of the basic distinctions between a judicial opinion and a law review
19. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20
(1959).
20. See section H supra.
21. Jones, supra note 4, at 1029. See section I supra.
22. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REv. 501, 502 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as Levi].
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article. An opinion treats a narrow fact situation, a specific case or
controversy; a law review article often treats a broader subject,
using the single opinion as a springboard for discussion. The good
judge will identify, isolate, discern the precise dispute, and usually
say no more, but the reviewer will use the identified dispute as a
vehicle for extended analysis of the law involved in the decision. The
opinion writer's specificity and discrimination require maximum
judicial restraint, as well as constant supervision of the staff who
would assist in this endeavor;2 the reviewer may-and should-give
freer rein to certain value judgments as to what something should
be.
. Disagreement between opinion writer and reviewer over the
choice of legal precepts, then, must be tempered by an understanding of these distinctions. Thus enters the importance of identifying
the precise dispute: not until both writer and reviewer have clearly
identified the dispute, and some common ground is found, may the
reviewer's jump to the "ought" begin. The good reviewer will resist
the temptation to criticize unfavorably a judge merely for his or her
choice of precepts when those precepts rest on a valid identification
of the precise dispute. Of course, when the reviewer can demonstrate that the writer misapprehended or misrepresented the dispute, this should be done. But such a situation is not the stuff of
which scholarly contributions are made. I suggest that the most
fruitful approach is for the reviewer to parallel as closely as possible
the court's dispute identification, and proceed to an analysis of the
precepts beyond that on which the court, in the exercise of its judicial function, may embark. Examining the life and future of those
precepts, judge-made or statutory, which the court deemed relevant, as well as the court's application of the law, can be a most
exciting challenge. And awareness by both writer and reviewer of
the importance of proper dispute identification again moves us toward the desired community and continuity of approach-leaving,
it must be noted, maximum room for the reviewer's creativity and
depth of analysis.
23. Oftimes, a judge is surrounded by recent alumni of the school of "reviewers." We
judges are parties of a self-fulfilling, if not self-defeating, prophecy. We surround ourselves
with clerks who have law review training in the constant quest for consummate minutiae.
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IV.

FALLACIES OF REASONING

Published opinions are the principal means of carrying out the
decisional process and, as such, qualify as "performative utterances." Professor J.L. Austin appears to have contrived the word
"performative." When combined with the word "utterances," the
term defines an expression that is not only articulated but also
operative. 4 Because judicial opinions fit this description,25 we can
say that a court's public performance in reaching a conclusion is at
least as important as that conclusion.
Thus, as well as exercising an awareness of the need to properly
identify the general components of a case and the precise dispute
addressed by a court in this exercise of the four basic functions of
the judicial process, the reviewer should examine an even more
particular aspect of the opinion-the construction of its legal reasoning. Felix Frankfurter said that "[flragile as reason is and limited as the law is as an expression of the institutionalized medium
of reason, that's all we have standing between us and the tyranny
of mere will and the cruelty of unbridled, unprincipled, undisciplined feeling." 2 Legal reasoning is the essence of the process of
justification, providing links in the chain of development of all areas
of law.27
Although reasoned exposition traditionally takes the form of a
logical syllogism,

.

there is, of course, much more to the judicial

process than dryly logical progression. In exercising a choice of legal
precepts, for example, the opinion writer does not necessarily appeal
to any rational or objective criteria; essentially, he or she exercises
24. J. AUSTIN, PbLosoptncAL PAPERs 220 (1961).
25. Here, too, lies the "operative" distinction between a court's opinion and a law review
article. Both are legal utterances; only the opinion is performative.
26. N.Y. Herald Tribune, August 30, 1972, at 15 (quoted upon Justice Frankfurter's
retirement after 23 years on the United States Supreme Court).
27. It affects not merely the development of "rules" or "principles"; today, American
courts are judicially formulating public policy, a result of the judiciary's shift from the
traditional to the sociological methods of decision making. See section V infra; B. CARDoZo,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCEsS 65-76 (1921); Jones, supra note 4, at 1030-31; Pound,
Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908).
28. The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example. It is reasoning
from case to case. It is a three-step process described by the doctrine of precedent in
which a proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law and then
applied to a next similar situation. The steps are these: similarity is seen between
cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case is announced; then the rule of law
is made applicable to the second case.
Levi, supra note 22, at 501-02.
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a value judgment and should be recognized flatly as doing so. A
frequent error of law reviews is to permit the reviewer who, at bottom, disagrees with the opinion writer's choice of major precept to
embark on an attack of the court's "reasoning." In fact, notwithstanding the nature of the published opinion, law reviews conduct
little analysis or criticism of reasoning qua reasoning. I suggest that
more attention should be focused on the methods utilized by the
opinion writers to justify their decisions, i.e., the reasoning itself.
Just as it is not too much to ask whether one disagrees with the
choice of the "authoritative starting point," and if so, why, it is not
too much to ask whether the reviewer's quarrel is with the formal
correctness of the syllogism used and, if so, where.
There is fertile ground upon which to criticize the reasoning in
opinions. The reviewer's responsibility to do so, however, must extend beyond superficial critiques of "the court's reasoning" or broad
accusations of fallaciousness. Any material fallacy" of logic should
be identified with particularity. For instance, when there occurs a
fallacy of irrelevance, often referred to as irrelevant conclusion or
ignoratio elenchi, it should be identified as such and explored. The
writer, in this instance, proves a point unrelated to the issue presented or, conversely, disproves a point similarly irrelevant. The
fallacy results in spending time and effort to prove something that
has not been asserted and which, most likely, bears little relevance
to the cause. In another form of the same fallacy, the writer assumes
that he has proven his own point by disproving those of another.
Another common fallacy is the fallacy of accident, or dicto
simpliciter,which occurs when the writer, confronted with a special,
exceptional case, attempts to apply a general rule. Thus, the case
which exists as an exception is brought within a universal statement
from which it previously was exempted. A converse fallacy also
frequently appears: the fallacy of selected instances, or the fallacy
of hasty generalization. This consists of amassing a few instances
and establishing a generalization or rule based on those alone. The
fallacy is in the lack of a representative number of particular instances to form a valid foundation. Dean Pound suggests, in this regard,
29. William S. and Mabel Lewis Sahakian have compiled an extensive anthology of
material fallacies, including those discussed herein. See W. SAHAKIAN & M. SAHAKIAN, IDEAS
OF GREAT PMLOSOPHERs 11-23 (1966).
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that often commentators will hastily generalize a holding into a
3
principle. 1
The fallacy of false cause, or post hoc, involves reasoning from
mere sequence to consequence, from what merely happened in
chronological order to the assumption of a causal connection. Then
there is petitio principii, or begging the question. In order to prove
that A is true, B is used as proof, but since B requires support, C is
used in defense of B, but C also requires proof and is substantiated
3
by A, the proposition which was to be proved in the first place.
V.

IDENTIFYING PUBLIC POLICY

The aspect of opinions most often at the root of a law reviewer's
disenchantment but, unfortunately, the aspect least articulated in
the reviews, is that of the value judgments exercised by the court"
in setting a definite public policy for a jurisdiction. We are all sophisticated enough today to acknowledge that judges are lawmakers.? Indeed, because of political tensions, often the state and federal legislatures are quick to enact legislation in broad, vague, ambiguous terms in order to leave to the courts the determination of
public policy. 34 For example, the law flowing from the Sherman
30. A good deal of complaint grows out of too much inclination to generalize in a
hurry, and too much inclination on the part of text writers to lay down something on
the basis of a particular case as a universal proposition. It gets into the encyclopedias,
gets reported in the reports, and before you know it, you have something that is a hasty
feeling, or groping for a principle masquerading as an established principle in the law.
Pound, Survey of the Conference Problems, 14 U. CIN. L. REV. 324, 331 (1940).
31. An example of this would be: "Orphans are unhappy." "How do you know?" "An
orphan told me." "How did you know he was an orphan?" "Because he was unhappy."
32. We must always bear in mind that an opinion of the court is a collegial effort. A draft
opinion is subject to intra-court criticisms, the end product often being the result of alterations and additions by the other judges who would join in it. Thus, it is sometimes more a
product of compromise than a true reflection of the opinion writer's value judgments.
33. John Chipman Gray often quoted Bishop Hoadley: "Nay, whoever hath an absolute
authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is He who is truly the Law Giver to all
intents and purposes, and not the Person who first wrote and spoke them." J. GRAY, THE
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 125 (2d ed. 1925).
Holmes assured us "[tihat judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially .... " Southern Pac. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1916) (dissenting opinion).
These latter-day recognitions appear to be far removed from Francis Bacon's admonition:
"Judges ought to remember that this office is Jus Dicere, and not Jus Dare, to interpret law,
not to make or give law."
34. Judge Charles D. Breitel of the Court of Appeals of New York has discussed the
difficulty which arises from this situation:
Legislative inaction, total or partial, in a troubled area may indicate a rejection of
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Antitrust Acts is essentially judge-made law, emanating from a
skimpy statutory text.3 Similarly, the Taft-Hartley Act 3l gave the
federal courts virtually carte blanche authority under section 301 to
promulgate a federal common law for labor relations. Other statutes
do not even furnish polestars for the court's guidance. Some merely
create procedural devices for the resolution and clarification of important issues and delegate to administrative agencies and the
courts the actual resolution of these problems, or demonstrate the
failure of legislative bodies to arrive at a consensus.
The vast majority of rules of conduct, whether promulgated by
the legislature or by a court, spell out policy choices. 9 Some judges
are free to recognize this in their opinions, others are not. Judge
Andrews' noted dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad" provides the best exposition of this point. With all due respect to the
author of the majority opinion, the great master Benjamin Nathan
Cardozo, a judge whom I respect as much as I do any judge in the
history of American law, I am nevertheless persuaded that Judge
Andrews was the more candid when, addressing the question of
proximate cause, he wrote:
proposals; or it may indicate a warrant to the courts to exercise the traditional common
law responsibility of piercing out, case by case, the necessary legal innovation. Unfortunately, there is no rule of thumb to distinguish these contradictory indications; the
only course is examination of legislative purpose by investigation of surrounding circumstances and the available legislative history.
Breitel, The Lawmakers, THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL BENJAMIN N. CAPwozo LECrURE 12
(1965).
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
36. The purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote competition and to inhibit
monopoly and restraints upon freedom of trade in all sectors of the economy to which
these laws apply. This purpose is as plenary as the statutory language which embodies
it. Hence, the antitrust laws have not merely been open to doctrinal eloboration, they
have required it; the process of adjudication, more than a means of enforcement, has
been an indispensible element in the formulation of the law.
L. SULLIvAN, ANTITRUST 14 (1977).
Not surprisingly, the United States Code Annotated annotations run nearly one volume in
length.
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-168, 171-182, 185-188 (1970).
38. See, e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h
(1970).
39. Whether contracts must be supported by consideration; whether a defendant
in an accident case should be spared liability because of plaintiffs contributory negligence; whether minors should be relieved of legal consequences that might otherwise
apply to their actions-these and a host of other issues treated in the common law are
basically questions of general public policy.
Selznick, supra note 8, at 95.
40. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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What we do mean by the word "proximate" is, that because of
convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the
law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a
certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics. Take our
rule as to fires. Sparks from my burning haystack set on fire
my house and my neighbor's. I may recover from a negligent
railroad. He may not. Yet the wrongful act as directly harmed
the one as the other. We may regret that the line was drawn
just where it was, but drawn somewhere it had to be. We said
the act of the railroad was not the proximate cause of our
neighbor's fire. Cause it surely was. The words we used were
simply indicative of our notions of public policy. Other courts
think differently. But somewhere they reach the point where
they cannot say the stream comes from any one source.
It is all a question of expediency. There are no fixed rules to
govern our judgment. There are simply matters of which we
may take account.
Once again, it is all a question of fair judgment, always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to make a rule in each
case that will be practical and in keeping with the general
understanding of mankind."
Yet there are bounds. There cannot be judgment by fiat. There
must be a reasoned accommodation of the conflicting claims and
interests at stake. The "performative utterance" must include a
societally acceptable explanation. In sum, the opinion that would
meet the Harry Jones/Roscoe Pound test of "how thoughtfully and
disinterestedly the Court had weighed the conflicting social interests involved in the case and how fair and durable its adjustment
41. Id. at 352-54, 162 N.E. at 103-04. As early as 1888, Justice Homes would say:
The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of course,
considerations of what is expedient to the community concerned. Every important
principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more
or less definitely understood views of public policy; most generally, to be sure, under
our practice and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to views of public policy in the last
analysis.
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 31-32 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
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of the interest-conflicts promises to be ' 42 should set forth a reasoned
elaboration of the interest-conflicts resolution.
Modern jurisprudence presses an inexhaustible inventory of
"social interests" upon jurists for attention. I have previously commented that with public policy often appearing as a polestar, Dean
Pound's "A Survey of Social Interest"" should be mandatory reading for today's law student and the subject of refresher courses for
lawyers, legislators, and judges." Pound recognized that "in the
common law we have been wont to speak of social interests under
the name of "public policy," 5 but he emphasized that the extent
to which the latter-day technique of "balancing interests" may be
considered valid depends, in the first instance, on identifying all the
interests.
The expression "balancing interests", first so described by Justice
Hugo Black, is useful, perhaps, but seriously misleading. The expression implies that the subject matter of the judicial process may
be precisely quantified. It may not. The best that can be hoped is
that all the interests at stake in a given case are identifiable. Having
identified the interests at stake, a judge can at least consider them,
but it is doubtful that he is ever really able to "balance" them. The
judge's accommodation of the competing interests-his or her priorities, if you will-in resolving the interest-conflicts will be durable
and acceptable to the extent that a reasoned accommodation of the
interests is regarded and accepted as fair.
Just as the opinion writer will strive to recognize and accommodate the relevant interests in a case, it is the reviewer's responsibility to couch any discussion in the same light. Where the law reviewer simply indicates that he or she dislikes the particular result
in the case, without more, or simply expresses a value judgment,
without more, the review should be sloughed off as sophomoric.
Where the law reviewer merely disagrees with the court's decision
because the writer-student or professor-favors certain interests or
42. Jones, supra note 4, at 1029.
43. Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1943).
44. ALDiSERT, supra note 18, at 600.
45. Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 H~av. L. REv. 1, 4 (1943). Pound divided
"interests" into three classifications: individual interest, public interests, and social interests. "[Tihe claims or demands or desires which human beings, either individually or in
groups or associations or relations, seek to satisfy, of which, therefore, the adjustment of
relations and ordering of conduct through the force of politically organized society must take
account .... " Id. at 1.
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groups over others, where it is simply a question of whose ox is being
gored, then, although the reviewer's right to disagree is to be respected, it is not legitimate to camouflage this basic policy disagreement as a criticism of an opinion writer's legal ability or scholarship.
If what is to be written is essentially a criticism of a judge's political
or social philosophy, it may more properly belong in a political
science journal than in a law review. But a continuity of approach
between opinion writer and reviewer in identifying and dealing with
the various interests will yield a very important area in which various critiques should be made: where the law reviewer can demonstrate that the court has not taken cognizance of all the interests,
or that there is a better adjustment that is available, then the criticism is acceptable and, indeed, warranted."
VI.

CONCLUSION

Thus we end as we began. There are rules and measures of a good
opinion which must be followed by the opinion writer. Those who
would review the opinion must use the same rules and measures.
The rule or measure is a complex ideal embracing standards for
assessing and criticizing decisions that purport to be legal, whether
made by a legislature or by a court, whether elaborating a rule or
applying it to a specific case.
Most definitions of law invoke a normative system and a master
ideal. Thus, St. Thomas Aquinas reminded us that law is "an ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has
the care of the community."4 But positive law, whether it comes
from the legislature or from the court, includes an arbitrary element. For those who must obey it, it is to some extent brute fact. It
is, in Philip Selznick's formulation, to some extent "brute fact and
brute command": "[T]his arbitrary element, while necessary and
inevitable, is repugnant to the ideal of legality. Therefore, the
proper aim of the legal order, and the special contribution of legal
46. Of course, there may be a simpler reason for the disagreement in what I hope is the
rare case in which a judge has simply overlooked a controlling statute or precedent. In that
case, too, a judge ought to accept the reviewer's criticism. It is apparent, however, that the
enduring law review analyses will be those discussing interests, not a specific failing whose
importance does not extend beyond one case.
47. II BAsic WITINGS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (A.C. Pegis ed. 1945), reprinted in M.
GOLDING, THE NATURE OF LAw 12 (1966).
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scholarship, is progressively to reduce the degree of -arbitrarinessin
48
the positive law."
The function of the modern American law review is exactly that:
progressively to reduce the degree of arbitrariness in the positive
law. However, just as a judge must resort to reasoned elaboration
instead of judicial fiat, so must criticism of a judge's work be free
from law review fiat. Thus appears the critical importance of continuity between writer and reviewer in the various approaches discussed herein. In effecting a proper and consistent approach, we are
able to evaluate decisions not in terms of "right" or "wrong," nor
in terms of subjective agreement or disagreement with the result,
but rather in terms of the thoughtful and disinterested weighing of
conflicting social interests. And thus will opinion writers, reviewers,
readers, and, indeed, the development of the law itself, be served.
48.

Selznick, supra note 8, at 66.

